phantom fury the 2nd battle for fallujah

Historically, tactical strike fighters were the blunt objects of CAS and not appropriate for an urban counterinsurgency fight. The downed Black Hawk in Somalia is the best illustration of why Regimental Combat Team 1’s (RCT–1’s) commander did not want them directly overhead Fallujah but rather wanted them to operate around the city’s fringes. They were vulnerable to ground fire, however. These pilots wanted nothing more than to support their ground brethren at war on Fallujah’s mean streets. When fighting broke out, Marine Corps Cobra and Huey squadrons provided CAS. Indeed Marines used CAS extensively in Fallujah earlier that year in Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE or “FALLUJAH I” in April 2004. Holy S…!ĭespite these challenges, the Marines never hesitated to employ CAS in Fallujah. There were lots of good guys fighting in Fallujah-ten battalions worth crammed into a five-kilometer square city composed of look-alike and densely packed, low-slung, brown/gray brick buildings. Finally there was the blue tracking problem. Ground and aviation units from other Services and nations participated. In Fallujah the additional challenge of a counterinsurgency environment existed, thus the need to minimize collateral damage and win hearts and minds, something not achievable if a city is razed by aerial attacks under the glare of a ubiquitous media.Īlso, it was a joint fight, both on the ground and in the air.

Any type of urban CAS qualifies as one of the most complex and demanding tasks known to modern warfare. It had been substantially facilitated by CAS. The high-tempo penetrating attack envisioned by Marine commanders was realized. I never knew a time in November when I had a TIC when I didn’t get an airplane within about a minute”.Īlthough sporadic fighting continued for weeks after, it took about 10 days for the main resistance to be squelched in Fallujah. “I tell you what, for like three weeks, it felt like nothing but a continuous faucet, a continuous fire hose of airplanes. Air strikes came continuously and in harmony with other fires most were “danger-close” and rapidly sequenced. In the follow-on battle, as the Marines, soldiers, and coalition troops fought door to door throughout the city, supporting fires were perpetual, a cacophony of precisely delivered destruction. The bombs created breaching lanes for Marines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines to exploit later that day. The main assault into Fallujah in November 2004 ( Operation PHANTOM FURY/AL FAJR) commenced when eight GBU–31s, 2,000-pound joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), dropped by Marine Fighter/Attack (All-Weather) Squadron 242 F/A–18Ds, smashed into a railroad-topped berm bordering Fallujah’s north side. This maximized the fantastic capability of aviation precision weapons and targeting technology, and in the case of Fallujah, made fixed-wing CAS an appropriate option for supporting fires, underscoring the utility and need for tactical aviation (TacAir) in the Marine Corps. The CAS plan was built on Marine Corps C2 basics-procedural control and unity of command, which were enhanced with a common map or grid reference graphic (GRG). Urban close air support ( CAS) successfully employed in Fallujah in 2004 highlights the capability of Marine Corps-style command and control (C2) of aviation. *** Operation Phantom Fury (Second Battle of Fallujah): Operation Phantom Fury was a joint U.S.-Iraqi offensive in November and December 2004 (Credit: USMC) He earned his doctorate in history from Texas Tech University and is currently a historian at the Marine Corps History Division, Quantico. Maj Allison is a former Marine F–4 radar intercept officer. Copyright retained by the Marine Corps Gazette) ( Reprinted courtesy of the Marine Corps Gazette. CAS: A CORE CONTRIBUTOR TO SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATED OPERATIONS IN FALLUJAH

Phantom fury the 2nd battle for fallujah